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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon ethical implications of 
human-robot interaction. Issues are discussed within two scenarios: (1) In 
focusing on robots with intelligent behavior, but without consciousness, 
attention is paid to obstacles for forming trustful relations. Here, it is concluded 
that human-robot interaction will lack the kind of commitment, which stems 
from the fact that life is interpersonal, implying that trust is a fundamental 
human condition. (2) In focusing on the possibility of developing intelligent 
robots with a mental life of their own, issues of our responsibility as creators of 
robots are discussed, as well as issues dealing with the kind of relationships we 
might have with such robots. Here, we are faced with a Good-like responsibility 
and ethical obligations towards a creature, who possible will develop a mind of 
its own, which might turn out to be radically different from the human mind. 
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1   Introduction 
With the recent upcoming of more and more human-like robots, which of course still 
are nothing but “stupid machines”, we might expect that such surprisingly human-like 
geminoids in a near future will be able to simulate intelligent behavior, when acting 
within restricted contexts.  
On an epistemological level we may still argue about the status of intelligence. 
But, in real life people will start to form relationships with robots, whether they are 
intelligent or not. The fact that they look a lot like us, combined with their growing 
ability to behave intelligent will cause new forms of friending and bonding in 
connection with human-robot interaction. 
The purpose of this extended abstract is to reflect upon ethical implications of such 
relationships. In particular issues are discussed from the perspectives below:  
(1) In focusing on the possibility of developing robots with intelligent behavior, 
but without consciousness, attention will be paid to obstacles for establishing trustful 
relations in connection with human-robot interaction.  
(2) In focusing on the possibility of developing intelligent robots with a mental life 
of their own, issues of our responsibility as creators of robots will be discussed, as 
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well as issues dealing with the kind of relationships we might establish with such 
robots1. 
2   Perspectives towards Artificial Intelligence 
In what follows, I will arrange my discussion with reference to two well-known 
perspectives towards strong artificial intelligence; since these two positions raise 
similar as well as different sorts of ethical issues regarding the character of human-
robot interaction.  
Within a behaviorist framework, we might be concerned with the idea of artificial 
intelligence from a perspective of performance. Consequently, it is not considered a 
meaningful project to maintain a distinction between real human intelligence and 
artificial intelligence, if last mentioned is indistinguishable from human intelligent 
behavior. The behaviorist perspective focuses on appearance, in holding a definition 
of intelligence in which intelligence equals intelligent behavior. This idea is 
encapsulated in the famous Turing test [2], which has not yet been passed by any 
machine.  
On the other hand, the perspective of reductive materialism towards intelligence 
assumes that consciousness is a valid concept; we do have a mental life, but mental 
states can be explained for in terms of the laws of physics. Hence, from a position of 
reductive materialism, we might argue that we can account for intelligence, emotions 
and consciousness within a physicalist framework - for instance by reference to 
neurology and bio-chemical processes. As such, we are (nothing but) nice machines 
ourselves; or as phrased by Marvin Minsky: “The brain is just a computer made out of 
meat!” [3].  
The ethical implications of these positions will be discussed from a 
phenomenological approach. Thus, one might ask what kind of ethical issues we are 
faced with if robots in the future come to look like us (sec. 2.1) or be like us (sec. 
2.2)?  
2.1   Ethical Issues in Relation to a Behaviorist Approach 
In a behaviorist framework, what can be said to characterize the kind of relations 
involved in human-robot interactions? Here, we are dealing with a “look-alike 
setting”, in which mental states are considered unnecessary. The robot’s behavior is 
all that counts. Similarly, if we were to deal with our human existence from a 
behaviorist perspective, we should only be interested in accounting for human actions 
with reference to complex stimuli-response patterns. In holding a pure behaviorist 
point of view, presupposing a symmetric relation between human and robot, ethical 
issues regarding human-robot interactions might be addressed within a utilitarian 
                                                          
1 There are of course relevant ethical related issues regarding agency and responsibility in a 
legal context, which I do not touch upon. These issues are discussed in an excellent paper by 
Ugo Pagallo [1] 
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framework, in which consequences of behavior could be accounted for ethically by 
measuring which behavior gave rise to the greatest amount of welfare.  
On the other hand, in arguing from a phenomenological position, we might 
maintain an asymmetric relation between the robot and ourselves, in which case the 
robot only looks like us, implying that even though interaction is smooth, the robot is 
simply a machine good at producing certain kinds of behavior, without any intentions 
behind it. Within this scenario, we can explore what is ethically at stake in human 
relationships, and discuss whether this can be carried over to human-robot interaction. 
Thus, it is generally acknowledged that trust is vital for the flourishing of human life, 
and a precondition of any cultural ordering2. Our fundamental human condition is 
rooted in the fact that life is interpersonal; we are mutually dependent on each other. 
Consequently, openness, in the sense of trusting, i.e., daring to risk ourselves in 
coming forward to meet the other, is a definitive feature of human co-existence and 
inherent in all communication [4].  When we place trust in others, it involves genuine 
risk-taking since we surrender ourselves to the other. But, in dealing with human-
robot interaction, we are not faced with having to surrender ourselves to the social 
robot. Even though the robot act in a human-like way, and displays emotions, there is 
nothing at stake, and I know that this is the case about our relationship – the robot 
simulates and I invest without cost. This does not necessarily imply that I will be 
unable to respond emotionally to the robot. However, our interaction will be risk-free 
and without demand.  
2.2   Ethical Issues from a Position of Reductive Materialism 
In a physicalist framework, matters appear differently. Here, we assume that our 
mental states are programmable, which will enable us to develop a robot, who do not 
only simulate intelligence, but has a mind of its own, probably even different from the 
human mind. In this scenario, the above-mentioned phenomenological objections do 
not count, because now robots and human beings are on equal footing. If we for a 
moment leave aside the fact that should it ever turn out to be the case that physicalists 
came up with an artificial intelligence with a mind of its own, then, in general, the 
phenomenological position would suffer severe problems. However, for the sake of 
argument, I shall maintain a phenomenological perspective in the exploration of 
ethical issues.  
Well aware that the robot might develop a mind radically different from ours, we 
would still have to address design issues in the first place, such as: should we set out 
to create a robot capable of feeling pain? Normally, we consider it morally wrong to 
cause somebody pain. Yet, we might argue that lack of ability to feel pain would 
reduce quality of life considerable for the robot, and maybe even make the robot 
unable to act emphatic towards others. Nevertheless, as human beings we use 
different kinds of enhancers to improve our life, so why not set out to design a robot 
in a state of permanent happiness? One objection could be that lack of challenge in 
life would probably make the robot unable to fulfill its potentials. But, we would not 
                                                          
2  See for instance Løgstrup [4], Rawls [5: 433], Fukuyama [6: 126], also within the field of 
economics, it is commonly known that trust is in general regarded as a “critical commodity”. 
CACIC 2011 - XVII CONGRESO  ARGENTINO DE CIENCIAS DE LA COMPUTACIÓN 1426
be able to take that for granted, since we might not recognize the kind of 
psychological developmental path the robot would follow. As such, the robot might 
evolve into a being entirely different from us, and demand ethical rights, which would 
be incomprehensible to us. Within this context of argument, we are faced with a God-
like responsibility and ethical obligations towards a creature, who possible will turn 
out to be beyond our imagination.  
3   Concluding Remarks 
This paper has dealt with ethical implications related to human-robot interaction 
within two scenarios of artificial intelligence, of which the first is already on its way, 
whereas the second scenario is probably not realizable within the nearest future.  
Thus, we are approaching a time in which human-like robots (capable of intelligent 
behavior within restricted contexts) will be able to provide us with reliable 
companionship. But, here we are dealing with risk-free relations without demands. 
Human-robot interaction will lack the kind of basic commitment, which stems from 
the fact that life is interpersonal. We live in a state of surrender to each other, 
implying that trust is a fundamental human condition, which we cannot escape. 
Placing trust in others thus involves genuine risk-taking, in the form of surrendering-
ourselves-to-others. This is the fundamental nerve of all interpersonal interaction, 
which a human-robot relationship will not have.  
In the second scenario, focus is on the possibility of developing robots with a 
mental life of their own. Here, we find ourselves faced with a God-like responsibility 
in deciding what kind of design we should implement. Furthermore, we might be 
unable to understand the robot, since it might turn out to develop a mind radically 
different from the human mind, and maybe even demand ethical rights of its own. 
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